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Recent Peasant Struggles in Rajasthan

INTRODUCTION

There has been a surge of militant agitations by peasants in Rajasthan over the last few years under the leadership of the All India Kisan Sabha and the CPI(M). These include, most importantly, struggles on issues related to canal irrigation in the command area of the Indira Gandhi Nahar Project and struggles on issues related to supply of electricity for agriculture. The struggles on the issue of canal irrigation took place in Ganganagar, Hanumangarh and Bikaner districts. The struggle on the power front was organised in the wake of neo-liberal power-sector reforms undertaken by the Congress and the BJP governments. While peasants from all over Rajasthan participated in this struggle, main mobilisation took place in Sikar, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Jalore, Churu and Bikaner districts.

This article describes and analyses the objective conditions that led to large scale mobilisation of peasants for militant agitation. It also documents the course of these agitations and discusses the importance of these agitations for the left movement in Rajasthan.

STRUGGLES FOR RIGHT TO WATER FROM THE IGNP CANAL

Background

The Indira Gandhi Nahar Project, or what was originally called the Rajasthan canal, was commissioned in 1958 and was built in two phases. The canal gets water from the Pong dam in Himachal Pradesh. The first phase of the project covered a command area of 5.53 lakh hectares. The second phase of the project aimed to provide irrigation to 14.1 lakh hectares of land. In addition, the project also aimed to provide drinking water, particularly in the phase II areas. Out of a total of 19.6 lakh hectares of ultimate irrigation potential, irrigation has been provided in 14.22 lakh hectares; most of the uncovered command area is in Phase II. Most of the drinking water schemes in the Phase II area are yet to be constructed.

There are three important differences between the two phases of the command area which are noteworthy.

First, large part of the command area of the project, in both the phases, was uninhabited before the project came into being. A large amount of this land was wasteland owned by the government. In the late 1960s, the State government, then headed by Mohanlal Sukhadia, proposed to auction the government-owned lands in Phase I of the project. In 1969-70, AIKS launched

a militant struggle in the area to demand redistribution of land in the command area to landless.¹ As a result of this struggle, the State government redistributed 4 lakh hectares of land to about 1 lakh families. Each landless family was given 16 acres of irrigated land, while those who had some land already were given land to raise the holding to 16 acres.² These redistributed lands constituted about 72 per cent of total land in the command area. The beneficiaries comprised landless and marginal farmers of neighbouring areas (Churu and Bikaner districts, and from command areas of Bhakra and Gang canals in Ganganagar districts) as well as households displaced because of construction of the Pong Dam. About 80 per cent of the beneficiaries belonged to the scheduled castes. The land was given at a price of Rs 17,500 for 16 acres to be paid in 20 instalments over a period of 10 years.

In contrast, government land in Phase II area of the project was auctioned by the government to highest bidders. As a result, land in the phase II area was purchased by the rich and the powerful, including traders, landlords, politicians and bureaucrats. A large amount of land in this area is known to be held as benami land by the rich landowners of Rajasthan, Haryana and Punjab. Some of the prominent politicians of these States are also known to hold large tracts of benami land in this area.

The second difference pertains to the differences in geographical features of the Phase I and Phase II areas. The soil in the phase I areas is fertile black cotton soil. The second phase, in contrast, includes large area that comprises sandy, undulating dunes. The soil in this part is not very fertile and the productivity levels are low. Also, as a result of large areas being covered with moving sand, maintenance of canals is difficult as these tend to get clogged with sand.

Thirdly, the canal system of the project was designed to provide 5.23 cusecs of water per 1000 hectares in the Phase I area and 3 cusecs of water per 1000 hectares in the Phase II area. According to official statistics, the water allowance in the Phase I command area of the project is high in comparison with other major canal projects of the country. For example, the canal irrigated areas of Punjab and Haryana get 3-3.5 cusecs per thousand hectares and the command areas of the Narmada projects get about 3 cusecs per thousand hectares. There are two other canal systems that supply water to Ganganagar district. These are the Bhakra canal system and the Gang canal system. The water allowance in the Bhakra canal system is 2.4 cusecs per thousand hectares and in the Gang canal system is about 2.56 cusecs per thousand hectares.

The 2004 Agitation

In 2002, the Ashok Gehlot government decided to reduce water allowance in the Phase I area from 5.23 cusecs per thousand hectares to 3.5 cusecs per thousand hectares. This cabinet decision, however, was not implemented by the then Congress government. In 2004, the newly formed BJP government under Vasundhara Raje Scindia decided to implement the reduction in supply of water to the Phase I area. This decision came in the wake of an agrarian crisis fuelled on the one hand by widespread crop failures caused by a series of drought years and on the other by declining profitability. The decline in

profitability in agriculture has been on account of sharp rise in cost of agricultural inputs, stagnant prices of agricultural produce and declining availability of credit for agriculture on account of neo-liberal economic reforms.

The decision to curtail the supply of water to the Phase I area was implemented at the time of sowing for the kharif crop in 2004. As a result of lack of supply of water, sowing could not take place in large parts of the command area. In particular, the command area of the Anupgarh branch canal remained entirely uncultivated.³

Inability to sow the fields resulted in widespread resentment. Among farmers. In September 2004, a broad coalition of peasants, workers and traders called Kisan Mazdoor Vyapari Sangharsh Samiti (KMVSS) was formed to launch a popular struggle to demand supply of water for the rabi season. It is noteworthy that traders, realizing that their fortunes were based on agricultural development of the area, decided to join the struggle of workers and peasants. The All India Kisan Sabha played an important role in formation of this organization and Comrade Sant Lekha Singh was elected president of the organisation. Given the widespread resentment, local leadership of various political parties, including the Congress and the BJP which had been behind the reduction in water supply, had to support the alliance. In particular, local leadership of Congress (the party had, in December 2003, lost the State assembly elections to BJP) actively participated in the leadership of the alliance.

On September 27, KMVSS launched a series of agitations starting with a sit-in at the office of Sub-divisional Magistrate of Gharsana. The sit-in continued for about one month and, over this period, a series of peaceful agitations were launched in Gharsana, Rawla and Anupgarh tehsils (Ganganagar district). On October 26, police encircled the towns of Rawla and Gharsana, and launched a massive *lathi charge* and tear gas attack at the agitating peasants. On October 27, a large crowd of peasants gathered at Rawla and Gharsana Mandis to protest the police action. When police again tried to surround them, the mob attacked the police. In retaliation, the police opened fire in which five persons were killed and hundreds of peasants and workers were injured. Subsequently, curfew was imposed in Gharsana, Rawla, Anupgarh and Khajuwala towns, and most leaders and hundreds of agitating peasants were arrested. Despite the crackdown by police, large-scale protests were organised over next several days every time the curfew was relaxed. In the first week of December, a peasant was killed when police cracked down to prevent a mass gathering of peasants in Khajuwala (Bikaner district). Following this incident, thousands of peasants gathered in Khajuwala and started an indefinite sit-in demanding that the government provide compensation to the families of the martyrs and accept demands of the peasants. The widespread condemnation of police repression and unflinching resolve of the peasants finally forced the government to come forward for negotiations.

On December 11, two ministers and senior bureaucrats of the Vasundhara Raje government held discussions with arrested leaders — Comrade Hetwam Beniwal, Ballabh Kochar and Saheb Ram Punia — in Ajmer jail and signed an agreement whereby they agreed that of the 14.1 thousand cusecs water

available from Pong Dam, 8.2 cusecs will be given to the Phase I area and 5.9 thousand cusecs to Phase II areas, maintaining the water allowance of 5.23 cusecs per thousand hectares in Phase I and 3 cusecs per thousand hectares in Phase II areas. *In conditions of shortfall in supply of water from the dam, water will be divided in the same proportion* (emphasis added). Drinking water facilities will continue to operate as per the need. The government also agreed to unconditionally release all arrested peasants and leaders, and constitute a judicial enquiry to examine the conduct of officials who were involved in police action against the peasants.

The Agitation in July-September, 2005

Although the government had agreed to provide water at the rate of 5.23 cusecs per thousand hectares, and in situations of scarcity, divide the total amount of water between Phase I and II in the agreed proportion (58:42), the agreement was not implemented at the time of supply of water during kharif season in 2005. The KMVSS warned the government that it will again start an agitation if water was not supplied. To start with, it gave a call for a public meeting to be organised on July 18. On July 18, when Comrade Hetram Beniwal was addressing this meeting, he was taken out by the police, brutally beaten up and taken to Nokha jail in Bikaner. Over the next few days, police launched a major crackdown and arrested about 500 other peasants.

The repressive action of the government sparked off a series of protest actions and bandhs, each with massive participation, in Ganganagar and Hanumangarh districts. The Kisan Mazdoor Vyapari Sangharsh Samiti gave a call for holding a *maha-panchayat* in Gharsana on August 1. The government pressed the police force into action to prevent this public meeting. Large number of peasant leaders in the area were arrested, prohibitory orders were imposed in Gharsana and vehicular movements were restricted. On July 31, the KMVSS decided to shift the venue of the meeting to a village near Gharsana. A huge public meeting was held the next day in 6 DD village. About 25,000 peasants reached the village despite police repression and change of venue on the last day.

The government, however, refused to hold talks with KMVSS. It launched a counter campaign against the KMVSS leaders arguing that their remands were unjust and that they did not enjoy support of the peasants of the area. In response to the *maha-panchayat* organised by KMVSS on August 1, the BJP organised a rally in Bandha in Ganganagar on August 4. The rally, addressed by the Chief Minister herself, drew very little response from the local peasants.

In August, the Rajasthan AIKS gave a call to organise joint struggle for supply of canal water and electricity for agriculture. To this end, AIKS decided to hold a *mahapadav* in Jaipur from September 1. This was a crucial decision as it helped widen the base of the struggle and made it difficult for the government to isolate and repress the agitation in the IGNP command area.

THE STRUGGLE ON THE ISSUES RELATED TO POWER SECTOR

Background

Groundwater is the most important source of irrigation in Rajasthan. As shown in Table 1, irrigation by wells and tubewells accounts for about 69 per cent of net irrigated area in Rajasthan. Tubewells are an important source of irrigation in a majority of districts. In most of the districts, the groundwater table is low and, therefore, reliable and adequate supply of electricity at reasonable prices is crucial for running the tubewells.

In 1999, the Congress government initiated the process of power sector reforms in Rajasthan. The government issued a Policy Statement on Power Sector Reforms in May 1999 in which it argued that the State needed to augment its installed capacity for power generation by about 5000 megawatts over the X plan period. It argued that the power subsidy to agriculture and domestic sectors resulted in a loss of Rs. 1000 crores to the State exchequer. The subsidy given to agricultural and domestic consumers and inefficiency of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board were considered to be the factors that prevented higher public and private sector investments in power sector in Rajasthan. These arguments were used by the government to push for power sector reforms.

In accordance with these policy objectives, the government passed the Rajasthan Power Sector Reforms Act in September 1999. Rajasthan has the dubious distinction of being the only State which broke up the State electricity board through one single Act. This act created one production utility, one transmission utility and three distribution companies (discoms). In January 2000, the government also established a Regulatory Commission for the power sector. Having thus proven its commitment to pursue power sector reforms, Rajasthan qualified for loans adding up to \$ 800-1000 million from the World Bank for carrying out reforms in the power sector. These loans were to be provided as a series of loans, each tied to a specific stage of the project and disbursed only if the conditions attached to the loans for the previous stage are met.⁴

The first loan, of \$180 million, was sanctioned for the period 2001-06. There are several conditions attached to this loan which determine functioning of the government and various institutions that are a part of the power sector. These include a commitment to disinvest majority stakes in discoms to private players. The loan agreement also required that all subsidies in the power sector be eliminated within four years, and to that end, price of electricity for agriculture and domestic uses be raised in a phased manner. The World Bank's roadmap for Rajasthan's power sector reform projected a growth of 26 per cent per annum in prices of electricity for agricultural consumers. This increase was supposed to be effected in a phased manner so as to avoid "tariff shock" and at a pace that is "politically, economically and socially sustainable". Apart from the delay caused by politically unsustainable reform programme, the successive governments have followed this roadmap to the book.

The first increase in electricity prices for agriculture came in 1999 itself. For the metered connections, prices were raised from 50 paise per unit to 70 paise per unit. In March 2001, the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Authority passed another set of tariff orders approving a further hike to 90 paise per unit.⁵ Not only did electricity become more expensive, over the years following enactment of the Rajasthan Power Sector Reforms Act, supply of

electricity to agriculture was curtailed sharply. The amount of electricity given for agriculture fell from about 6.6 billion units in 2000-01 to about 3.8 billion units in 2001-02 (Figure 1).⁶

The increase in prices of electricity and reduction in supply to agriculture played an important part in the defeat of Congress in 2003. The BJP, on the other hand, had taken a position against increase in prices of electricity for agricultural consumers. In 2001, the BJP was among those who objected to the rise in tariff for agriculture when the issue was being debated in the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission. In its manifesto for the 2003 elections, BJP promised a roll-back of price hike and an increase in supply of electricity to agriculture if it were voted to power. Interestingly, however, after being voted to power, BJP made an about turn and went ahead with the power sector reform programme of the previous government.⁷

In December 2004, the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Authority approved a further price hike in tariff for agricultural consumers. This time, the price of electricity for agriculture was raised to Rs. 1.10 per unit.⁸

It is noteworthy that, given the stated policy of discouraging flat rate pricing, price increases have been even more stiff for the consumers who paid a flat rate price (per horse power of load). In 2001, the flat rate price was increased by about 42 per cent (from Rs. 60 per horse power to Rs. 85 per horse power). In 2004, the flat rate was increased further by about 65 per cent (to Rs. 140 per horse power).⁹

The hike in prices of electricity caused severe resentment among peasants. In view of this, the All India Kisan Sabha and the CPI(M) decided to combine the ongoing struggle for canal water and the struggle for electricity and launch a major agitation. The agitation for reversing increase in power prices started in July in Sikar with a series of demonstrations. Subsequently, large demonstrations were organised in July and Augusts in towns and villages of Nagaur, Churu, Jaipur, Jhunjhunu, Bikaner and other districts. On August 14, the Kisan Sabha announced that it will hold a *mahapadav* (large-scale indefinite sit-in) in Jaipur from September 1 if government did not accept the demands.¹⁰ Over the following two weeks, activists of the Kisan Sabha and CPI(M) campaigned in villages of various districts to mobilise peasants to participate in the *mahapadav*.

A massive sea of peasants surged towards Jaipur on the night of August 31. All the major roads leading to Jaipur were blocked by tractors moving towards the venue of the *mahapadav*. On September 1, peasants gathered in the Amroodon-ka-bagh, a large public ground near the State assembly in Jaipur and the main venue of the *mahapadav*, as well as in other large grounds of the city. It is estimated that about 1 lakh peasants participated in the sit-in over the next seven days. While peasants from most districts participated in the sit-in, large numbers of them came from Sikar, Nagaur, Jhunjhunu, Jaipur, Jodhpur, Jalore, Churu and Bikaner districts. The congregation approved a charter of twelve demands which was given to the government. This charter demanded, most importantly, that the hike in electricity prices be revoked, that electricity for agricultural purposes be provided for 12 hours a day, and that electric connections be provided to peasants on demand. In addition, the peasants also demanded that all leaders and peasant who had been arrested in connection with the IGNU

struggle be released and that the government implement the agreement it signed with the Kisan Mazdoor Vyapari Sangharsh Samiti on December 11, 2004.

On September 2, the second day of the *mahapadav*, a large rally of peasants and workers was organised in Jaipur. On September 3, the Students Federation of India organised a public meeting in support of the peasants' struggle. On September 4, various organisations, including citizens' groups based in Jaipur, took out a *Unity Rally* to express solidarity with the peasants. A similar rally was organised again on September 5. Lakhs of peasants walked the streets of Jaipur on that day. At 13.15 hour, all the participants of the rally stopped where they were and made a collective appeal to the citizens of Jaipur to support the cause of the peasants. On September 6, the peasant leaders announced that if the Chief Minister did not invite them for talks by 11.00 am on September 8, the peasants will march towards to the Chief Minister's residence and peasants, under the leadership of women from all over the State, will block the roads to Jaipur.

The BJP government had refused to talk to the peasants until the seven days after the *mahapadav*. On September 7, the government constituted a six-member ministerial committee to negotiate with the peasants. This committee met the leaders but the talks failed because the committee was not empowered to announce a roll back in prices. The peasants resolved that they will march towards the Chief Minister's residence unless she herself met the leaders and accepted their demands. In the early hours of September 8, government made a last attempt at using police to disperse the peasants. The sheer size and the courage of vigilant peasants however foiled their sinister plans. Finally, on September 8, the Chief Minister was forced to invite peasant leaders for talks.

The eight-day long *mahapadav* came to an end with the government accepting all the twelve demands of the peasants. Accordingly, government suspended collection of electricity dues according to the new tariffs and ordered that payments be collected only as per the existing rates. Cases against peasant activists of the IGNU command area were also withdrawn and the arrested peasant activists were released.¹¹

PEASANT AGITATIONS IN RAJASTHAN AND THE WAY FORWARD

The impact of these peasant struggles on political process in Rajasthan has been enormous.

First, these agitations, particularly in 2005, were conducted under the leadership of the All India Kisan Sabha and the CPI (M).

Secondly, these agitations successfully exposed the anti-people face of the BJP government in Rajasthan.

Thirdly, although the agitations were directed against the policies of the present BJP government, the policies of this government were based on anti-peasant initiatives taken by the previous Congress government. The decision to curtail supply of water to the Phase I area of the IGNU command was a decision of the Ashok Gehlot government. Similarly, it was the Congress government which initiated the power sector reforms in Rajasthan and committed to hike in electricity tariff for agriculture when negotiating for the

World Bank loans. During the course of these agitations, the complicity of Congress in the anti-peasant policy making in Rajasthan became obvious to the people. Although, the local leadership of Congress in Ganganagar and Hanumangarh played an important role in formation of KMVSS, their participation was only marginal when KMVSS decided to launch another agitation in 2005. Given its role in power sector reforms in Rajasthan, the Congress did not take a position against the increase in prices of electricity for agriculture. When peasants of Rajasthan put up a massive show of strength in Jaipur under the leadership of AIKS and CPI(M), the Congress stood as a mute spectator.

The peasant struggles resulted in major political gains for CPI(M) in the March 2005 elections for the Panchayati Raj institutions, particularly in Ganganagar, Hanumangarh and Bikaner districts. The number of seats of CPI(M) in Zilla Parishads increased from 5 to 14. Of these, four were in Ganganagar, two in Hanumangarh, two in Bikaner and four in Sikar district. The CPI (M) also wrested from Congress the post of chairperson of the Anupgarh Panchayat Samiti. The Anupgarh Panchayat Samiti covers Gharsana, Rawla and Anupgarh tehsils, the citadels of the peasant struggle for canal water from IGNP. The number of elected members of CPI(M) in various panchayat samitis increased from 26 to 46. CPI(M) has also won on a large number of seats of Sarpanch in gram panchayats, particularly in Ganganagar, Hanumangarh and Sikar districts. In a noteworthy contrast, the Congress and BJP suffered major losses in these districts.

There has also been a substantial rise in AIKS membership in Rajasthan after the *mahapadav*. AIKS had only about 1000 members in Jaipur district until last year. Over one month following the *mahapadav*, the membership in Jaipur district alone reached 20,000. The State Committee of AIKS has set a target of doubling the membership in the State over this year.

These agitations have helped reverse some of the extremely anti-peasant policy initiatives of the BJP government. Mobilisation of peasantry at such a massive scale and successful conduct of the agitations has helped energise the working people in Rajasthan and in other parts of the country. The course of these agitations holds important lessons for the movements in other parts of the country.

NOTES

¹ Other demands raised by AIKS then were: an increase in supply of water through the Bhakra canal, reversal of increase in price of water for irrigation of commercial crops, and grant of ownership rights to tenants cultivating *jagirdari* land without any price. At the same time, an agitation under the banner of Kisan Sangharsh Samiti led by Chaudhary Kumbharam Arya mainly focused on the abolition of jagirdaris. The Kisan Sangharsh Samiti did not take up the demand for redistribution of land and, in fact, wanted the land ceiling laws to be relaxed. At that time, the leadership for the struggle for implementation of land ceiling act and redistribution of land was provided by the AIKS.

² In comparison, the applicable land ceiling on the irrigated land in the area was about 30 acres.

³ Official statistics available until 2003-4 show sharp decline in the cultivation of cotton and paddy between 2001-2 and 2003-4. In 2001-02, cotton was sown on 2.4 lakh acres and paddy on twenty thousand hectares. In 2003-04 area sown with cotton came down to 1.8 lakh acres and area cultivated with paddy came down to only about two thousand acres. Farmers were forced to shift to crops that required no or small amounts of irrigation. Area under *gwar* went up from 2.5 lakh acres in 2001-02 to 5.1 lakh acres in 2003-04. Area under oilseeds went up from about 5 thousand acres to about 20 thousand acres. Area under bajra went up from 5 thousand acres to 30 thousand acres and under kharif pulses from 32 thousand acres to 87 thousand acres.

⁴ Such loans, called Adaptable Program Loans by the World Bank, are the “cornerstone of the Bank’s current approach to supporting India’s state power reforms.” World Bank (2001), Fueling India’s Growth and Development: World Bank Support for India’s Energy Sector, [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachments/InEnergy/\\$File/InEnergy.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachments/InEnergy/$File/InEnergy.pdf).

⁵ See <http://rerc.gov.in/ajmpwc.htm>, <http://rerc.gov.in/jodpwc.htm>, and <http://rerc.gov.in/jaipwc.htm>.

⁶ The 1999 Policy Statement on Power Sector Reforms argued that the State needs augment the installed capacity in power sector by 5000 megawatts over the X Plan period. It is noteworthy that over the four years following the enactment of the Rajasthan Power Sector Reforms Act, the installed capacity in the power sector went up by only 968 MW.

⁷ See Tariff orders on Petition Nos RERC/tariff/5/2000, RERC/tariff/6/2000 and RERC/tariff/7/2000 at http://www.rerc.gov.in/tariff_orders.htm.

⁸ See <http://rerc.gov.in/TariffOrder-05.pdf>

⁹ These were subsequently reduced to Rs. 115 after an agreement with the Kisan Sangh affiliated to RSS/BJP.

¹⁰ It is noteworthy that in 1997 a similar *mahapadav* had successfully forced the BJP government led by Bhairon Singh Shekhawat to roll back hike in power tariff and promise supply of electricity for 10 hours a day.

¹¹ There was some delay in release of about 50 peasant activists because of the judicial process. AIKS organised public meetings in Rawla and Gharsana to demand their release and it is expected that they will be released at the earliest.


Table 1. Extent of irrigation by different sources, district-wise, Rajasthan, 1998-99

District	Share of different sources in net irrigated area				Proportion of net sown area that is irrigated
	Canals	Tanks	Tubewells and wells	Other sources	
Bikaner	90.1	0.0	9.7	0.2	13.7
Jaisalmer	87.7	0.0	12.3	0.0	18.3
Barmer	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	7.4
Jodhpur	0.0	0.0	99.9	0.1	12.6
Churu	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	3.6
Ganganagar	99.9	0.0	0.1	0.0	71.4
Hanumangarh	98.9	0.0	1.1	0.0	37.9
Nagour	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	20.5
Sikar	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	39.4
Jhunjhunu	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	39.4
Pali	0.0	3.0	97.0	0.0	30.1
Jalore	0.0	0.0	99.9	0.0	51.7
Sirohi	3.5	6.5	89.8	0.1	54.1
Jaipur	1.4	0.2	98.3	0.1	52.2
Dausa	2.5	0.1	97.4	0.0	67.8
Tonk	18.5	5.1	75.7	0.7	36.4
Ajmer	2.5	7.1	90.1	0.3	28.0
Alwar	1.4	0.1	98.5	0.1	66.4
Bharatpur	2.4	0.0	97.6	0.0	52.5
Dhoulpur	4.2	0.4	95.0	0.3	58.4
Sawai Madhopur	25.8	2.1	71.4	0.7	53.2
Karauli	12.1	3.4	84.2	0.3	46.5
Udaipur	0.0	26.5	71.2	2.4	32.1
Chittorgarh	2.2	2.0	94.8	1.1	36.8

Rajasamand	0.0	5.2	94.8	0.0	38.5
Dungarpur	13.6	15.8	62.2	8.4	28.2
Banswara	64.0	9.2	10.8	15.9	37.7
Bhilwara	6.9	7.9	84.3	0.9	38.2
Kota	58.0	0.2	37.9	3.9	77.4
Baran	35.6	2.7	57.2	4.5	66.0
Bundi	58.2	0.9	40.1	0.8	68.7
Jhalawar	9.0	0.2	89.2	1.6	50.0
Rajasthan	28.3	1.7	69.1	0.9	100.0

Source: Gupta, Anish (2005), Agro-climatic Regions of Rajasthan, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, mimio.

Figure 1. *Supply of electricity to agriculture, Rajasthan, 1987-88 to 2004-05*



Source: Statistical Abstracts of Rajasthan and <http://www.rajenergy.com>